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5
Individual Employee Rights Versus the Rights of Employees as a Group: NLRB v.
City Disposal Systems, Inc. 1 — The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) 2 is based
upon the premise that employees, as individuals, are not strong enough to bargain
effectively with their employers over wages, hours, or other conditions of employment.°
In section 7 of the NLRA, Congress sought to equalize bargaining power between
employees and their employer by guaranteeing employees the right to organize and act
collectively for purposes of bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. 4 Central to
this right to organize is the concept of exclusive representation by a union selected by a
majority of the employees in a bargaining unit.° Without the provision of exclusive
representation, Congress believed that unions' collective bargaining power would be
meaningless, and that some employers would be encouraged to divide their employees
against themselves. 6
 Consequently, the NLRA's model of collective bargaining requires
that many individual interests be subordinated to the interests of the group. 7 The Act
recognizes, however, that the rights of individuals must be protected in the process.°
1 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
3 See id. § 151. See also 79 COM:, REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). In explaining
the reasons for allowing and encouraging collective action by workers, Senator Wagner said,
Ought in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise,
[the worker) can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation with others of his group." Id.
4 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection ...
Id.
Senator Wagner explained that section 7 of the Act merely provides that employees, if they
desire to do so, are "free to organize for their mutual aid or benefit ... to make the worker a free
man in the economic as well as the political field." 79 CONG. REC. 2371 (1935).
5
 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that the majority of employees
may choose a representative to be the sole representative of all employees in that unit. for the
purposes of bargaining over wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Section 9(a) states
in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment ....
Id.
6
 79 CONG. REC. 2372 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). in introducing the bill that became
the NLRA, Senator Wagner argued that the exclusive representation clause of section 9(a) meant
that a majority of employees in a unit may decide who is to be the spokesman for all in making
agreements over wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. He pointed out that the
concept of exclusive representation conformed with the democratic procedure followed in every
business and in governmental life. Without a provision establishing exclusive representation, Senator
Wagner argued, the phrase "collective bargaining" would be meaningless and some unfair employ-
ers would be encouraged to divide workers against themselves. Id.
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975); J.I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
g See Schwartz, Different Views of the Duty of Fair Representation, 34 LAB. L.J. 415, 429 (1983).
Schwartz states that not only must labor laws protect individual rights, but also that the union
movement itself "must ensure and enforce fair representation and guarantee the broad rights of
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Since the Act's inception, courts have struggled to maintain a balance between the
principles of exclusive representation and individual rights.° Despite attempts to balance
individual rights with group interests, the tension between these two principles continues
in labor law today.
This tension between the principles of exclusive representation and individual rights
can be seen in the problems which courts have experienced in interpreting the language
of section 7 of the NLRA. Section 7 guarantees employees the right to self-organization,
to choose an exclusive representative for collective bargaining, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual benefit. 10
In interpreting this provision of the NLRA, the United States Courts of Appeals have
disagreed about which actions by individual employees fit within the section 7 definition
of "concerted activities" for the "purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection."" The circuit courts' different interpretations of section 7's "concerted activ-
ities" language have been a function of the disagreement over whether more emphasis
should be placed on protecting the individual rights of employees or, instead, on pro-
tecting unions' bargaining power as the exclusive representatives of employees. 12 In one
line of cases, five courts of appeals interpreted the "concerted activities" language of
section 7 literally, and required that either the activity be engaged in by more than one
employee or, if engaged in by an individual, that the activity be intended to induce
group action. 13 In a conflicting line of cases, three courts of appeals held that the
language of section 7 must be interpreted in light of the broader principles underlying
the Act." These courts reasoned that an action by an individual employee was concerted
individuals" in order to balance protection of individual rights with protection of group interests
by the principle of exclusive representation. Id.
See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 60-62; J.I. Case, 321 U.S. at 338-39. Both the Emporium
Capwell and J.I. Case decisions are discussed infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
'° 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
" Compare Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983) (Ninth Circuit limited
its interpretation of "concerted activities" to the express language of the Act); Roadway Express,
Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 693-94 (1 ith Cir. 1983) (Eleventh Circuit adhered to limited inter-
pretation of "concerted activities" announced in Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683,
685 (3d Cir. 1964) (where Third Circuit interpreted "concerted activities" to require that activity
be "looking toward group action")); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979) ("We
think this expansive reading of the concerted activity clause of section 7 goes too far."); NLRB v.
Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1973) (Fifth Circuit questioned statutory
basis for Interboro doctrine); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1971)
(Third Circuit adhered to strict definition of "concert"), with NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d
205, 206 (7th Cir. 1971) (Seventh Circuit adhered to broad interpretation of "concerted activity"
employed in Interboro); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 1970) (Eighth
Circuit based its interpretation upon its recognition of the broad purposes of the Act); NLRB v.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967) (Second Circuit interpreted "concerted
activities" as encompassing an individual's actions).
' 2 See infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
Royal, 703 F.2d at 374 (Ninth Circuit limited its interpretation of what constitutes concerted
activities to the express language of the Act); Roadway, 700 F.2d at 693-94 (Eleventh Circuit adhered
to limited interpretation of "concerted activities" announced in Mushroom, 330 F.2d at 685 (where
Third Circuit interpreted "concerted activities" to require that activity be "looking toward group
action")); ARO, 596 F.2d at 717 ("We think this expansive reading of the concerted activity clause
of section 7 goes too far."); Buddies Supermarkets, 481 F.2d at 719 (Fifth Circuit questioned statutory
basis for Interboro doctrine); Northern Metal, 440 F.2d at 884-85 (Third Circuit adhered to strict
definition of "concert"). See infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
14 Interboro, 388 F.2d at 500 (Second Circuit interpreted "concerted activities" as encompassing
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under section 7 so long as the activity was grounded in a right contained in the collective
bargaining agreement. 15
 The United States Supreme Court recently resolved this split
among the circuit courts. Adopting a broad interpretation of section 7, the Court, in
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.,'fi held that a single employee's invocation of a right
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement constitutes concerted activity.
In City Disposal, a collective bargaining agreement between the employer, City Dis-
posal Systems, Inc., and Local Union No. 247 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the Union) provided
that City Disposal Systems would not require employees to drive any vehicle not in safe
operating condition.' 7 If an employee refused to operate an unsafe truck, that refusal
was not a violation of the collective bargaining agreement unless such refusal was "un-
justified." 1 e The dispute in City Disposal arose when an employee covered by the collective
bargaining agreement brought his regularly assigned truck to the garage for repairs and
then refused to drive a second truck, claiming the second truck was also unsafe.' 9
Arguments between this employee and two of his supervisors ensued," and City Disposal
Systems discharged the employee. 21
The day after his discharge, the employee filed a written grievance, pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement, asserting that the truck that he had been requested to
drive was defective," that the employer had improperly ordered him to drive the truck,"
and that his discharge was, therefore, improper. 24 The union, however, found no objec-
an individual's actions). See also Ben Pekin, 452 F.2d at 206 (Seventh Circuit adhered to broad
interpretation of concerted activities employed in Interboro); Selwyn Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221 (Eighth
Circuit based its interpretation upon its recognition of the broad purposes of the Act). See infra
notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
. 15 See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
16 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
,7 Id. at 824-25 (1984). The collective bargaining agreement provided:
The Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways any
vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with safety appliances
prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where employees refuse
to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.
Id.
'" Id. at 825.
19 Id. at 826-27. On Saturday, May 12, 1979, the employee, James Brown, having nearly collided
with truck number 244 while he operated truck number 245, observed that a fellow employee had
difficulty with the brakes of truck number 244. When truck number 244 was returned to the
employer's truck-repair facility, both Brown and the driver of truck number 244 were told that the
brakes on number 244 would be repaired either over the weekend or on the morning of Monday,
May 14, 1979. Id.
On Monday, May 14, Brown experienced problems with his regular truck, number 245, and
he brought number 245 in for repair. Brown's supervisor first ordered Brown to punch out and
go home, but then changed his mind and asked Brown to drive truck number 244. Brown refused,
explaining that something was wrong with the brakes, but he did not explicitly refer to the collective
bargaining agreement. Id.
20 Id. at 827.. Brown's supervisor angrily told Brown to go home, but an argument ensued.
Another supervisor intervened and repeated the request that Brown drive number 244. Brown
again refused, claiming number 244 had problems." The supervisors returned to their offices, and
Brown punched out and went home. Later that day Brown received word that he had been
discharged. Id.
2 ' Id.
22 Id.
"Id.
24 id,
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tive merit in the grievance and declined to process it." The employee then filed an
unfair labor practice charge against City Disposal Systems with the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board), challenging his discharge as a violation of his rights pro-
tected by section 7 of the NLRA. 26
Following the initial hearing, the administrative law judge held that an individual
employee who acts alone in asserting a right under a collective bargaining agreement
may be engaged in concerted activities, 27 and that the employee's actions in City Disposal
were concerted within the meaning of section 7 of the Act." The administrative law
judge reasoned that an individual complaining of safety matters that are embodied in
the collective bargaining agreement is complaining not only in his own interest., but is
also attempting to enforce such contract provisions in the interest of all employees
covered under the agreement. 29 Adopting the findings and conclusions of the adminis-
trative law judge, the Board ordered that the discharged employee be reinstated with
back pay. 3°
Upon the Board's petition for enforcement of its reinstatement and back-pay order,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overruled the administrative
law judge's and the Board's interpretation of "concerted activities."'" Finding that the
employee's refusal to drive the second truck was an action taken solely on his own
behalf, 32 the court of appeals stated that for an individual's act or complaint to amount
to concerted activity under the NLRA, the activity must not have been made solely on
behalf of an individual employee." Rather, the court required that the activity be made
on behalf of other employees, or at least be made with the object of inducing or preparing
22 Id.
2h Id. The employee filed an unfair labor practice charge against his employer, claiming that
his employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with an employee's attempts to exercise rights guaranteed to him under
section 7. 29, U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
27 City Disposal Systems, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 451, 454, 107 L.R.R.M. 1267, 1267 (1981). See 29
U.S.C. §§ 153, 160 (1982). The procedure in an unfair labor practice case begins with the filing of
a charge. In City Disposal, the employee, James Brown, filed with the Regional Office of the NLRB.
Section 10 of the NLRA provides for the issuance of a complaint stating the charges and notifying
the charged party of a hearing to be held concerning the charge. 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1982).
Complaints issue only after investigation by the Regional Office. The unfair labor practice hearing
is conducted before an NLRB administrative law judge, under the authority of section 10(b) of the
Act. Id. All parties to the hearing may appeal the administrative law judge's decision to the Board
itself. The Board may then make its own determination on the unfair labor practice charge, and if
it finds an unfair labor practice, the Board may issue a cease and desist order. Id. § 160(c). If a
party fails to comply with the Board's cease and desist order, the Board may seek enforcement of
its order in the United States Court of Appeals. Id. § 160(e). Additionally, any party aggrieved by
a final order of the Board may'ohtain review of such order in any appropriate circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals. Id. § 160(f). See also C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 832-36
(1971) (summary of procedures in unfair labor practice cases).
28 City Disposal, 256 N.L.R.B. at 454, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
29 Id.
" Id. at 451, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 683 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1982).
92
	 at 1007.
as Id. In City Disposal, the Sixth Circuit followed the standards it set forth in ARO for determining
whether activity was concerted. Id. See ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 5911 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979).
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for group action, 54
 and that the activity have some arguable basis in the collective
bargaining agreement. 35
 Having reasoned that the employee's refusal to drive a truck
was solely in his own interest," the appeals court concluded that such refusal did not
constitute concerted activity within the meaning of section 7 of the NLRA. 37
In a five-to-four decision delivered by Justice Brennan, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals decision and adopted the Board's interpretation of
what constitutes "concerted activities" under the NLRA." According to the Court, an
individual employee's reasonable and honest invocation of a right provided for in his or
her collective bargaining agreement is concerted activity within the meaning of section
7 of the Act."
Although the Supreme Court's method of interpreting the concerted activities clause
of section 7 was consistent with the broader principles underlying the Act, the Court
failed to consider the impact of its decision on the basic principle of exclusive represen-
tation. In enacting sections 7 and 9(a) of the Act, Congress intended to encourage
employees to organize into a united body, rather than into a number of units that could
be isolated and dominated by the employer.° The bargaining strength of employees lies
not only in their right to organize but also in their ability to present one united position
for the unit as a whole. 11
 The Court's decision, permitting individual employees to pursue
claims independently under the collective bargaining agreement, however, may reduce
the bargaining power of the exclusive representative. This reduction of bargaining power
may weaken the grievance and arbitration process and eventually cause a decline in
unionization. When a union loses bargaining power or is abandoned by its members,
there is a real danger that employee rights obtained and enforced through collective
bargaining will disappear with the bargaining power of the union. If the City Disposal
decision causes a decline in the bargaining power of elected employee representatives,
or in unionization in general, as this casenote maintains it will, then this decision aimed
at preserving individual employee rights, ironically, will ultimately weaken the economic
strength that employees possess as a collective group.
This casenote will First outline the development of the principle of exclusivity, and
explain that concept's continued importance in national labor policy. Section II will
discuss the split among the circuit courts over the interpretation of "concerted activities."
Following this discussion, Section III will present the Court's decision and reasoning in
City Disposal. Finally, Section IV will examine the method the Court used to interpret
section 7, and will then analyze the impact that the Court's decision may have on
employees' rights and benefits. The City Disposal Court used the majority approach of
interpreting section 7 of the NLRA when it considered the underlying principles of the
Act. The analysis of the City Disposal decision will focus on the Court's failure to consider
the principle of exclusive representation. The City Disposal Court's decision may cause a
" City Disposal, 683 F.2d at 1007.
Id.
'6 1d.
"Id. at 1008.
" NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1984).
"Id.
" See supra notes 3 & 5 for text of sections 7 and 9(a) of the Act.
See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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derogation of the grievance and arbitration process and eventually a decline in unioni-
zation. The casenote concludes that although individual employees may be better able
to enforce collective rights after City Disposal, employees may have fewer rights to enfor. ce.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND UNION POWER
The national labor policy of the United States, as embodied in the NLRA, requires
that one union serve as the sole representative for all the employees in a plant or other
bargaining unit. 42 According to section 1 of the NLRA, the inequalities in bargaining
power between individual employees and their employer are eliminated through the
practice of collective bargaining by means of exclusive representation of all employee
interests:" Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that a representative elected by a majority
of the employees in a unit" shall be the sole representative of all employees in the unit
for purposes of collective bargaining over wages, hours, and other conditions of em-
ployment. 45 Congress adopted the principle of exclusive representation because it per-
ceived that the individual employee was too weak to bargain effectively with the large
92 Dunlop, Structure of Collective Bargaining, in 4 READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR
RELATIONS 144 (R. Rowan ed. 1980). The practice of exclusive representation followed the American
political custom of electing single representatives by majority vote. Id. In 1880, the American
Federation of Labor adopted the principle of exclusive representation as a method to reduce conflict
among unions by permitting only one union to represent employees in a particular unit. Id.
Employers generally accepted exclusivity because it reduced disputes among rival unions and thus
stabilized labor relations in their plants. Id. The national labor policy also embodied the principle
of exclusive representation once the government decided to regulate collective bargaining. Id. In
early twentieth century labor legislation, including the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Congress adopted
legislation that permitted employees to elect by majority vote is single representative for the entire
group. Id. Finally, Congress enacted the NLRA with its provision for majority rule in 1935. Id.
4
"29 U.S.C. 151 (1982). Section 1 of the NLRA recognizes an inequality in bargaining power
between employees who are unorganized and employers who are organized in corporate or other
forms of ownership association. Id. By protecting the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively, the national labor policy best promotes a free How of commerce; encouraging collective
bargaining and restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees removes
many of the recognized sources of industrial unrest. Id. See 79 CONG. Rec. 7565 (1935) (statement
of Sen. Wagner). In defending the proposed bill that became the NLRA and its protection of
collective action, Senator Wagner argued that employees were too small and weak as individuals to
attain freedom and dignity in the industrial world; only by cooperating with each other could
workers achieve gains in their employment contracts, Id. In introducing that same bill, Senator
Wagner said that without the provisions establishing exclusive representation, the phrase "collective
bargaining" was devoid of meaning, and some employers would be encouraged to divide their
employees against themselves. 79 CONG. REC. 2372 (1935). See also Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 MARV. L. REV. 601, 638, 652 (1956). Cox stated that individual interests would be
better protected by first recognizing group interests in labor contract administration and then by
increasing the group representative's awareness of its obligations, both legal and moral, of repre-
senting all employees fairly, rather than by favoring individual causes of action by individuals over
union representation. Id. at 652.
44 In Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 172 (1971), the Supreme
Court held that the standard for determining an appropriate unit is whether those included in the
group share a "community of interests." In Allied, the Court held that pensioners did not share
with active employees a community of interests broad enough to be included in the bargaining
unit, irrespective of whether pensioners are employees within the definition of section 2 of the
NLRA in the first place. Id. Therefore, the Court held that unilateral activity by the employer to
offer changed pension benefits to pensioners was not an unfair labor practice against the union
then in place. Id.
"29 U.S.G. § 159(a) (1982).
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and organized corporate employer." The policy favoring collective bargaining through
the exclusive representative over piecemeal action by individuals and small groups of
employees represents a calculation by Congress that in a business world populated by
powerful corporations, the individual employee lacks the economic power to strike an
advantageous employment bargain:0 Collective action as a unit represented by one
bargaining agent, therefore, serves the economic interest of employees as a group and
individually." Congress felt that without exclusive representation to establish majority
rule within the unit, organizing for the purpose of collective bargaining would be
meaningless because some employers would be encouraged to divide organized but
varied groups of their employees against themselves: 19
The NLRA recognizes that although the concept of exclusive representation requires
that many individual interests be subordinated to the interests of the union as a whole, 5 "
the rights of individuals also must be protected. Thus, national labor policy has provided
a balance between the principles of exclusive representation and individual rights. First,
the United States Supreme Court has implied a duty of fair representation on the
exclusive representative." Under this doctrine, a union must serve the interests of its
members in good faith and without discrimination. 52 Second, the NLRA permits em-
ployees to vote out an exclusive representative in a decertification election." Third, since
1959, the Landrum-Griffen Act has provided a bill of rights for union members to assure
that minority voices are heard in labor organizations, as they are heard in other demo-
cratic institutions."
" 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). See supra note 43.
47 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community 01-g.,
420 U.S. 50, 63 (1975) (Supreme Court emphasized exclusive representation as the key to equalizing
bargaining power under the NLRA); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 passim
(1967); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 passim (1944).
48
 Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 63; Allis -Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 180; J.1. Case, 321 U.S. at '338.
" 79 CONG. REC. 2371-72 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). Senator Wagner argued that
without provisions establishing exclusive representation as a basic principle of labor policy, collective
bargaining would be almost meaningless because employers could divide workers among themselves.
Id.
" Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); J.I. Case, 321 U.S.
at 338. See also Crenshaw v. Allied Chem. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 594, 599 (D.D.C. 1974) (court
provides excellent summary of Supreme Court decisions in this area); Cox, supra note 43, at 625-
27, 638, 652 (promoting group interests is the better way to protect individual interests).
51 Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 64; Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182.
" Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982). Employees have the right periodically to vote out a union in a
decertification election, though such a right is limited by rules designed to provide stability for a
representative newly recognized or in the process of negotiating a new collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id.
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982). Section 101 of the Landrum-Criffen Act guarantees to every
member of a labor organization equal rights and privileges within that organization. Id. § 411(0(1).
The Landrum-Griffen Act also guarantees freedom of speech and assembly to every member of
any labor organization. Id. § 41 l(a)(2). This bill of rights for employees also provides a guarantee
against increased dues, initiation fees, or assessments without compliance with standards intended
to guarantee due process. Id, 411(a)(3). The right to sue is protected by the Landrum-Griffen
Act, and due process is guaranteed before disciplinary action by the union may be taken. Id.
§§ 411(a)(4)—(5).
Section 101(b) of the Landrum-Griffen Act nullifies any labor organization's constitution or
bylaw provision that is inconsistent with the above-listed rights. Id. § 411(b). An employee's right to
bring civil suit against the union is protected, as is any other remedy otherwise available to the
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While attempting to maintain a balance between group interests and individual
rights, the Supreme Court traditionally has recognized that the principle of exclusive
representation is a central premise of the NLRA and the key to effective collective
bargaining by unions. 55 For example, in the 1944 case off/. Case Co, a. NLRB, 56 a union
was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for employees whose individual
employment contracts were still in effect. 57 The employer claimed that the individual
contracts were a bar to negotiating over matters affected by those individual contracts.m
The union then filed unfair labor practice charges, claiming that the employer had
refused to bargain with it in violation of section 8(a)(5), 55 and had impeded employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act." The Court found the
employer's refusal to bargain over matters covered by individual contracts to be an
unfair labor practice, and upheld the enforcement of the Board's bargaining order, 61
The Court in J.I. Case reasoned that the purpose of providing for collective agree-
ments by statute was to replace individual contracts with provisions that served the
interests of the group and that reflected the strength and bargaining power inherent in
an organized group of employees. 62 According to the Court, national labor policy was
intended to obtain improved benefits for employees as a group through the process of
collective bargaining. Maintaining that "majority rules," 63 the Court recognized that such
a practice might result in some individuals losing rights by the collective agreementf4
The Court held, however, that the theory and practice of collective bargaining looked
with suspicion on individual agreements that provided for individual advantages, 65 be-
cause individual advantages would often be earned only at the expense of some other
benefit thought to be for the welfare of the group. 66
employee under state or federal law. Id. §§ 412, 413. Employees are also guaranteed the right to
obtain copies of their collective bargaining agreements. Id. § 414. Finally, every labor organization
is required to inform all members of their rights under these provisions. Id. § 415.
" Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62 ("Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining
where the employees elect that cause, is the principle of majority rule."); Allis -Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
180 (the Court recognized that by acting through a labor organization, employees have the most
effective means of bargaining for improvements in working conditions); /I. Case, 321 U.S. at 338-
39 (the Court acknowledged that exclusive representation is necessary to benefit the group as a
whole).
56 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
" Id. at 333.
$i' Id. at 334.
5" Id. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to refuse to bargain with
the exclusive representative of the employees over wages, hours, and other conditions of employ-
ment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
66 1.1. Case, 321 U.S. at 334. Interference with employees' attempts to exercise rights guaranteed
by section 7 is a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and thus an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1982).
6, ././. Case, 321 U.S. at 391-42.
" Id. at 338.
" Id. at 339.
64 Id. at 338.
es Id .
66 Id. at 338-39. The Court reasoned that individual advantages are a "fruitful way" of inter-
fering with organization and choice of representatives. Id. at 338. Even if individual advantage is
deserved, the Court held that such advantage is earned at the expense of breaking down some
other standard believed to be for the benefit of the group. Id. at 339. Thus, the Court held that
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The Court re-affirmed its adherence to the principle of exclusive representation
thirty years later in the case of Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization.° In Emporium Capwell, a union invoked the grievance procedure under the
collective bargaining agreement by demanding a full hearing by the Union-Management
Adjustment Board on charges that the employer was racially discriminating against
employees.6° Four employees felt that this procedure was inadequate and suggested that
the union picket the employer. 6° The union refused, and advised these employees to
participate in the grievance procedure hearing. 70 At the first meeting of the Adjustment
Board, those four employees demanded another method of resolving the issue, and then
walked out of the hearing. 71 The employees distributed handbills and picketed the
employer. 72 The employer warned the employees that further picketing and public
statements about the company could result in their discharge." When the employees
picketed the employer again, they were discharged. 74 The Court found no unfair labor
practice on the employer's part, and upheld the discharge of the employees:"
The Court held that even though the important principle of nondiscrimination was
embodied in national labor policy "as a matter of highest priority," 76 the employees'
picketing of their employer was unprotected by the NLRA. 77 Although the collective
bargaining agreement contained a no-strike clause," the Court did not rely on this fact
in reaching its decision. Instead, the Court explained that a labor union has legitimate
interests in presenting a united front on issues such as discrimination and in seeing that
its bargaining power is not reduced by subgroups within the unit pursuing what they
perceive as interests separate from those of the group as a whole." The Court stated
that exclusive representation is the principle at the very base of the process of collective
bargaining that is encouraged by national labor policy." Although recognizing that the
picketing was conducted for the laudable purpose of combating discrimination, 81 the
Emporium Capwell Court concluded that the principle of exclusive representation could
not endure the fragmentation of the unit along racial lines," The Court, therefore, held
that the employees' picketing was unprotected."
While attempting to maintain the balance between the principles of exclusive rep-
resentation and individual rights, the Supreme Court recognized in .J./. Case and Empor-
the majority rules, and if the majority decides to collectivize the employment bargain, then individual
advantages will generally be sacrificed as a contribution to the collective result. Id. at 338-39.
"7 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
6' Id. at 53-54.
69 Id. at 54.
70 Id. at 54-55.
71 Id. at 55.
"Id. at. 55-56.
73 Id. at 56.
7-1 Id.
Id. at 73.
" Id. at 66.
77 Id. at 72.
78 Id. at 53.
" Id. at 70.
" Id. at 62.
Id. at 70.
" Id.
" Id. at 72.
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ium Ce*wen that a presumption behind national labor policy is that the individual em-
ployee lacks the economic power to achieve an equitable employment agreement.
According to the Court, national labor policy dictates that the interests of individuals
and minority groups within the bargaining unit be subordinated to the exclusive bar-
gaining status of the majority-elected labor organization. 84 Providing for representation
of all employee interests by one labor organization, the Court has held, eliminates the
inequality in bargaining power between employees and employers and thus fulfills a
major purpose of the Act: to encourage collective bargaining in order to promote
industrial peace."
II. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS SPLIT OVER How TO INTERPRET "CONCERTED
ACTIVITIES"
In interpreting the meaning of section 7 of the NLRA, the United States Courts of
Appeals also have struggled to maintain a balance between the principles of exclusive
representation and individual rights. Section 7 provides employees with the right to self-
organization, to choose an exclusive representative for collective bargaining, and to
"engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." 86 In construing the concerted activities clause of section 7,
the courts of appeals have reached different conclusions on the issue of whether actions
by individual union members constitute concerted activities under the Act. In one line
of cases, three federal courts of appeals asserted that the concerted activities clause must
be interpreted in light of the broader principles of the Act." These courts held that
individual action attempting to enforce a collective bargaining agreement is simply an
extension of the concerted activity that produced the contract, and that because it affects
the interests of all workers under the contract, such individual action constitutes a
concerted activity under the NLRA. 86 Conversely, in a conflicting series of cases, five
circuit courts maintained that concerted activities should be more literally construed,
and that individual action must not only be based in the collective bargaining agreement,
but also must be conducted on behalf of other employees, and not solely for the benefit
of the individual. 88
"1 See supra notes 62-66, 80-83 and accompanying text.
" See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section I of the NLRA recognizes that unequal bargaining power
between employees and employers is the cause of much industrial strife; however, by allowing
employees to organize and elect an exclusive representative, the inequality is eliminated, and
collective bargaining is thereby encouraged, with the ultimate result being industrial stability. Id.
m. See supra note 4 for text of section7.
' 7 NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967) (Second Circuit
interpreted "concerted activities" as encompassing an individual's actions). See also NLRB v. Ben
Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1971) (Seventh Circuit adhered to broad interpretation of
"concerted activities" employed in Interboro); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221
(8th Cir. 1970) (Eighth Circuit based its interpretation of 'concerted activities" upon its recognition
of the broad purposes of the Act).
" See supra note 87.
"9 Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983) (Ninth Circuit limited its
interpretation of "concerted activities" to the express language of the Act); Roadway Express, Inc.
v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 693-94 (11th Cir. 1983) (Eleventh Circuit adhered to limited interpretation
of "concerted activities" announced in Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir.
1964) (where Third Circuit interpreted "concerted activities" to require that activity be "looking
toward group action")); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979) ("We think this
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The 1967 case of NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc. is the leading case upon which
courts advocating a broad interpretation of section 7's requirement of concert have based
their decisions. 90 In Interboro, two employees were discharged because they had com-
plained about working conditions. 91 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found substantial evidence that one of the discharged workers was speaking for
both, and thus was engaged in concerted activities. 92 The court approved the Board's
finding that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by restraining the
employees' right to engage in concerted activities protected by the Act. 95 The Second
Circuit, therefore, enforced the Board's order to reinstate the complaining workers.
In an alternative holding, the court also ruled that, even absent an interest by fellow
employees, an individual employee's attempts to enforce the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement may be deemed to be concerted activities. 95 This alternative hold-
ing, which has become known as the Interboro doctrine, represents a broad interpretation
of the "concerted activities" language of section 7. Courts that adopted the Interboro
doctrine gave two justifications for employing this approach to determining what con-
stitutes concerted activities under section 7. First, courts asserted that individual action
seeking to implement the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is merely an
extension of the concerted activities which gave rise to the agreement in the first place. 96
Second, courts also maintained that the assertion of a collectively bargained right affects
the rights of all employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement. 97 This line
of reasoning involves interpreting the "concerted activities" language of section 7 in view
of the principles and purposes underlying the NLRA. 98 Therefore, the courts adopting
the Interboro doctrine reasoned that permitting individual employees to enforce their
collectively bargained rights was consistent with the NLRA's principle of encouraging
collective bargaining in order to promote industrial stability. 99
expansive reading of the concerted activity clause of section 7 goes too far."); NLRB v. Buddies
Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1973) (Fifth Circuit questioned statutory basis for
Interboro doctrine); NLRB v, Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1971) (Third
Circuit adhered to strict definition of "concert").
9° 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
Interboro, 388 F.2d at 497-98.
92 Id. at 498.
" Id. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with an employee's exercise of section 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 7 guarantees
an employee the right to self-organization, to join or form labor unions, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual benefit. Id. § 157.
Interboro, 388 F.2d at 501.
65 Id. at 499.
66 See Ben Pekin, 452 F.2d at 206; Selwyn Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221. Both cases held that rights
secured by the collective bargaining agreement, though personal to each employee, are protected
rights under section 7 of the NLRA because the collective bargaining agreement is the result of
concerted activities by the employees for their mutual aid and protection. Ben Pekin, 452 F.2d at
206; Selwyn Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221.
Interboro Contractors Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537, 1537 (1966).
See Selwyn Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221. In analyzing the individual employee's activity under the
"concerted activities" language of section 7, the court determined that approving the employee's
discharge would "thwart the very purposes of the Act - the promotion of harmony in labor-
management relations and the recognition of an individual's right to organize for mutual protection
and individual security." Id.
9" Sec supra note 43 for a discussion of why Congress considered collective bargaining vital
when it enacted the NLRA.
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Twelve years later, in ARO, Inc. if, NLRB,m° the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit rejected the Interboro doctrine and called for a more literal interpretation
of what constituted concerted activities under section 7. 10 ' In ARO, the employer ter-
minated a temporary employee due to a newly adopted cost-cutting policy. 102 The ter-
minated employee complained repeatedly about the order of discharge, since permanent
employees hired after she began employment kept their jobs. 105 The terminated em-
ployee sought reemployment for the next several months, but six months later the
employer informed her that she would not be rehired because of her complaints re-
garding the order of termination. 104 Arguing that the employer's reason for refusing to
rehire her interfered with her section 7 right to engage in protest which would have
benefited other employees, the employee filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board." Reasoning that even individual protests that benefit the unit are concerted
activities, the Board ordered that the terminated employee be reinstated.' 06 In a suit for
enforcement of the Board's order, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
en foreement. 107
In considering the terminated employee's unfair labor practice charge against her
former employer, 166 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined
to adopt the holding of Interboro.i"9 The Sixth Circuit held that Interboro's interpretation
of the concerted activities clause of section 7 was too expansive."° The ARO court held
that the "concerted activities" language of section 7 meant what it said, reasoning that
section 9(a) of the Act did not expand the scope of section 7's "concerted activities"
language.'" For individual claims or complaints to amount to concerted activities under
the Act, the ARO court reasoned that the activity at issue must not have been made
solely on behalf of an individual employee."" Rather, according to the court of appeals,
the employee must have acted on behalf of other employees or at least have acted with
the object of inducing or preparing for group action." 5 In addition, the court concluded
that the employee must be able to base her assertion on a right provided for in the
collective bargaining agreement.'" Finding that the record fully supported the conclu-
sion that the terminated employee's complaints were made on her own behalf, the Sixth
Circuit held that the complaints were not protected concerted activities. 115
The principal distinction between courts following Interboro and courts following
ARO was the breadth of the interpretation given section 7 of the Act. Courts following
RP" 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979).
L°' Id. at 717.
W2 Id. at 714-15.
' 0 Id. at 715.
IN Id.
'05227 N.L.R.B. 243, 243-44, 94 L.R.R.M. 1010, 1010-11 (1976).
106 1c/. at 244-45, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1011-12.
107 227 N.L.R.B. 243, 94 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1976), enforcement denied, 596 F.2d 713 (1979).
' 596 F.2d at 713-14. The employee charged the employer with violating section 8(a)(1),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with an employee's exercise
of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act. Id.
,09 1d. at 717.
Ho Id,
", Id. at 718- 19.
" 2 1d. at 718.
110 Id .
114 Id.
11s Id.
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Interboro called for a broad interpretation of "concerted activities." These courts asserted
that an individual's attempt to implement the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
was part of the same concerted activity which produced that agreement in the first place,
and thus affected the rights of all employees covered by the agreement. 16 Conversely,
courts following ARO proposed a narrower, more literal interpretation of section 7. 117
The Interboro doctrine, according to these courts, was too expansive an interpretation of
the express language of the Act, and thus the doctrine had a questionable statutory
basis." 8
III. THE COURT'S DECISION IN CITY DISPOSAL
A. The Majority Opinion
In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 19 the United States Supreme Court, in a five-
to-four decision, resolved the split among the circuit courts and held that an individual
employee's attempts to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement are
concerted activities within the meaning of section 7 of the NLRA. 12° Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, first stated that the Board has the primary responsibility for
defining the scope of the NLRA. 121 Noting that the scope of section 7 was an issue that
implicated the NLRB's expertise in labor relations,' 22 the Court narrowed the issue before
it to whether the Board's construction of the "concerted activities" language of section
7 was reasonable.'"
118 Ben Pekin, 452 F.2d at 206; Selwyn Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221. Both cases held that rights secured
by the collective bargaining agreement, though personal to each employee, are protected rights
under section 7 of the NLRA because the collective bargaining agreement is the result of concerted
activities by the employees for their mutual aid and protection. Ben Pekin, 452 F.2d at 206; Selwyn
Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Royal, 703 F.2d at 374; Roadway, 700 F.2d at 693-94; ARO, 596 F.2d at 717; Buddies
Supermarkets, 481 F.2d at 719; Northern Metal, 440 F.2d at 884-85.
18 See, e.g., Royal, 703 F.2d at 374 (Ninth Circuit limited its interpretation of "concerted
activities" to the express language of the Act); Roadway, 700 F.2d at 693-94 (Eleventh Circuit
adhered to limited interpretation of concerted activities announced in Mushroom, 330 F.2d at 685
(where Third Circuit interpreted "concerted activities" to require that activity be "looking toward
group action")); ARO, 596 F.2d at 717 ("We think this expansive reading of the concerted activity
clause of section 7 goes too far."); Buddies Supermarkets, 481 F.2d at 719 (Fifth Circuit questioned
statutory basis for Interboro doctrine); Northern Metal, 940 F.2d at 884-85 (Third Circuit adhered
to strict definition of "concert").
119 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
'to Id. at 841.
121 Id. at 829.
122 Id.
128 Id. at 830. The Court rejected the argument made by the employer in this case that since
the scope of the "concerted activities" clause is essentially a jurisdictional or legal question concerning
the coverage of the Act, the Court should not defer to the expertise of the Board in this case. Id.
The Court reasoned that the issue in this case was substantially similar to issues upon which the
Court had not hesitated to defer to the Board's interpretation in the past. Id. at 830 n.7. See, e.g.,
Bayside Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1977) (the Court deferred to the Board's
interpretation of the definition of agricultural workers under section 2 of the NLRA); NLRB v.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975) (the right under section 7 to have the union
representative present at an investigatory interview of the employee was an issue upon which the
Court deferred to Board's "fair and reasoned" interpretation of the scope of section 7).
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In examining the Board's interpretation of this portion of section 7, the Court first
noted that the term "concerted activities" is not explicitly defined by section 7 or by any
other provision of the NLRA.' 24 Nevertheless, the Court found that "concerted activities"
clearly encompasses acts of employees who have joined together to achieve common
goals. 125 "Concerted activities," the Court held, however, should not be read to refer
only to situations in which two or more employees are working together for a common
goal.' 26 Instead, the Court held that this language of section 7 must be interpreted in
light of the underlying principles of the NLRA.' 2. 7
Citing the NLRA's goal of equalizing bargaining power between employees and
their employer, 128 the City.Disposal Court analyzed the Board's interpretation of section
7 in light of this goal. 12° Because the potential for inequality between employee and
employer continues beyond the signing of a collective bargaining agreement, the Court
stated that the collective bargaining process extends through the enforcement of the
agreement."° Thus, according to the Court, the invocation of a right that is rooted in
the collective bargaining agreement is unquestionably a part of that process."' Therefore
the Court held that an individual's assertions of a right contained in a collective bar-
gaining agreement may be protected by the NLRA because it is an extension of the
concerted activities which produced the collective bargaining agreement.'" The Court
determined that holding such activities to be concerted mitigated the inequality in
bargaining power that existed between employee and employer throughout the duration
of the employment relationship.'" Thus, the Court held that the Board's finding that
an individual's assertion of a right contained in the collective bargaining agreement
constitutes concerted activities, was consistent with the congressional intent of equalizing
bargaining power between employee and employer. 134
The Court defended its decision to grant protection to an individual's assertions of
collective bargaining agreement provisions by pointing out that the decision did not
undermine the grievance and arbitration process,'" which is favored by national labor
policy.' 35 First, the Court stated that any employee who intentionally provoked discharge
124 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 830.
' 25 Id. at 831.
126
' 2, Id, at 831-39. The Court noted the policy of equalizing bargaining power throughout the
term of the labor-management relationship. Id. at 833-36. The Court found the Interboro doctrine
consistent with the purposes of the Act: to encourage collective bargaining and industrial peace in
resolving differences over wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Id. at 833-34. The
Court also considered the effect on the grievance and arbitration process of permitting individual
enforcement of collectively bargained rights. Id. at 837-39.
"8 Id. at 832-34.
"6 Id. at 833-34. See .supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text for a presentation of the
Board's interpretation of "concerted activities" in Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295,
61 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1966).
186 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 831-33.
"I Id. at 832.
132 Id. at 832,835-36.
1 " Id. at 835.
," Id. at 834-35.
'" Id. at 838-39.
"6 Id. See infra notes 177-84,207-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the favored
status of the grievance and arbitration process.
March 1986)	 CASENOTES	 467
in order to come under the Board's jurisdiction and to bypass the grievance procedure
does so. at the risk of having such action found unprotected, even though concerted.'
Second, the Court stated that granting the NLRA's protection to individual assertions
of collectively bargained rights did not shift dispute resolution from the grievance
procedure to the Board any more than the Sixth Circuit's requirement that the individual
intend to induce group action or group benefit to obtain NLRA protection does.'"
Third, the Court pointed out that to the extent that any factual issues raised in an unfair
labor practice proceeding had been, or could be, addressed through the grievance and
arbitration process, the Board may defer to that process.'"
The Court further placed three limitations on its holding that an individual's asser-
tions of collectively bargained rights constituted concerted activities under section 7 of
the NLRA. First, the Court stated that an employee can lose the protection of the Act
if he or she engaged in concerted activities in an "abusive" manner. 140 Second, the Court
held that employers were free to negotiate a provision in collective bargaining agreements
which limited the manner in which employees may invoke their collectively bargained
rights."' Finally, the Court noted that, at some point, an individual employee's actions
become so remotely related to the activities of fellow employees that it cannot reasonably
be said that the individual employee was engaged in concerted activities. 142
Thus, adopting .a broad interpretation of section 7, the Court upheld the Board's
ruling that an individual's assertions of collectively bargained rights constitutes concerted
activities under this provision of the NLRA,'" The Court found that this holding was
consistent with one of the underlying purposes of the NLRA, the equalization of bar-
gaining power between employee and employer. 144 The Court did not, however, extend
NLRA protection to all assertions by individuals of collective bargaining provisions:
"7 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 838.
1 " Id. The Court reasoned that when an individual employee invokes a right which at the very
least is intended to induce at least one other employee to join him, his action is concerted in all
jurisdictions. Id. But in that situation, the Court explained, the underlying substance of the dispute
between the employees and the employer is the same as when a single employee invokes a collectively
bargained right by himself. Id. The City Disposal Court stated that both individuals are in identical
situations, and because the employee in each of the situations is "equally well-positioned" to go
through the grievance and arbitration process, there is no basis for singling out the Interboro doctrine
. as undermining that process any more than the approach taken by the Courts of Appeals which
had rejected the Interboro doctrine. Id.
M M. at 838-39.
' 4° Id. at 837. See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724,729 (5th Cir. 1970).
Some behavior is so abusive that it falls outside the protection of the NLRA. Id. The Supreme
Court's apparent standard of "abusive conduct," however, rests upon the principle that emotions
run high in any labor dispute, and thus some leeway for impulsive behavior should be granted.
City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 837 (citing Crown Central, 430 F.2d at 729). The right to engage in impulsive
behavior is to be balanced against the employer's right to maintain order. Crown Central, 430 F.2d
at 730.
141 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 837. For example, no-strike provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement are one way of limiting employee methods of invoking collectively bargained rights. Id.
= 42 Id. at 833 n.10. The Court noted that action that could be characterized as "purely personal
griping" would not be held to be concerted activity because it is so unrelated to the interests and
activities of fellow employees. Id.
143 Id. at 832-41. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
144 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 833-36. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
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concerted activities may nonetheless be unprotected if abusive, restricted by the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, or only remotely related to the activities of fellow
employees. 145
B. The Dissenting Opinion
justice O'Connor, writing for the four dissenting justices, rejected the majority's
holding that an individual employee's assertion of a collectively bargained right consti-
tutes concerted activities under section 7 of the NLRA.' 46 According to the dissent, the
concepts of individual action for personal gain and concerted activities are incompati-
ble.' 47 The dissent asserted that the Court should have adopted the narrow interpretation
of concerted activities proposed by the Sixth Circuit in ARO.' 48
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that finding an individual
employee's assertions of collectively bargained rights to be concerted contradicted the
"concerted activities" language of section 7. 549 The dissent stated that by providing
increased statutory protection for employees who participate as a group in the enforce-
ment of the agreement, the labor laws encourage and preserve the "practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining." 15° Therefore, according to the dissent, interpreting
section 7 so that the NLRA protects two employees acting together, but not one employee
acting alone, is entirely consistent with the national labor laws' emphasis on collective
action.'' In contrast, the diSsent argued, where an employee acts alone in expressing a
personal concern, contractual or otherwise, such action is not concerted.' 52 Interpreting
the concerted activities clause of section 7 to mean instructing individual employees to
seek vindication through their union, and where necessary, through the courts, the
dissent argued that the Act's protection was reserved for collective activity.'"
The dissent proposed that providing the protection of the NLRA to individuals who
assert collectively bargained rights transfers the ultimate authority for contract construc-
tion and dispute resolution to the Board." , Such a transfer of authority, according to
the dissent, is a step toward governmental regulation of the terms of collective bargaining
agreements.'" The dissent noted that this transfer of authority is a step Congress
expressly declined to make.' 56 Therefore, the dissent argued that extending the protec-
tion of the NLRA to individuals who assert collectively bargained rights is contrary to
Congress' judgment as to how contract rights are best vindicated.'S 7
145 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 837. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
145 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"7 Id.
HS Id. at 847 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 846-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
15" Id. at 844-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62).
' 51 Id. at 845 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 844-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'' 3 Id. at 845-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 842-43 (O'Connor. J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156 /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1946)).
157 Id. at 845-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that section 7 of the NLRA
merely points to the proper vindication of rights under the collective bargaining agreement;
vindication is obtained either through private or judicial processes (arbitration or the courts) if the
activity is not concerted, and through the administrative processes of the NLRB if the activity is
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The dissent also criticized the Board's failure to defer to the grievance process in
this case and in other cases that had come before the Board.'" Pointing out that in
unfair labor practice proceedings, the Board normally defers to factual determinations
made during the grievance and arbitration process,' 59 the dissent noted that the Board
had failed to defer to that process in City Disposal,m where the union determined that
the employee's grievance lacked objective basis. 161
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion recognized that the statutory language of
"concerted activities" did not prevent the activity of an individual employee from being
concerted.' 62 The dissent acknowledged that the statutory language could be stretched
to cover an individual employee's actions when undertaken to induce, prepare for, or
initiate group action.'" The dissent, however, stated that "it stretches the language [of
section 7] past its snapping point to cover an employee's action that is taken solely for
personal benefit."'"
IV. RECONCILING CONCERTED ACTIVITIES AND EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
The Court in City Disposal held that an individual employee's invocation of a right
provided for in his or her collective bargaining agreement constitutes concerted activi-
ties.'" Since such individual action constitutes concerted activities, the action may be
afforded the protection of the NLRA under section 7. 166 While the City Disposal Court
correctly considered some of the underlying principles of national labor policy when it
interpreted the "concerted activities" language of section 7, the Court ignored the
principle of exclusive representation, 167 which is one of the central premises of the
NLRA. 168 This failure to recognize the principle of exclusive representation may result
in a decline in the bargaining power of the exclusive representative, derogation of the
grievance and arbitration process, and a decline in unionization. Ironically, therefore, a
ruling designed to expand the concept of concerted activities could ultimately weaken
workers' collective strength.
This section will first examine the method of analysis that the City Disposal Court
used to interpret section 7 of the NLRA. This section will then assert that although the
concerted. Id. According to the dissent, the integrity of contract rights is upheld under either
scenario. Id.
' 66 Id. at 844 n.4 (O'Connor,	 dissenting), Justice O'Connor criticized the Court for mentioning
the policy of deferral to the grievance process while failing to discuss why the Board did not defer
to the grievance process in City Disposal. Id.
E56 Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the Court in City Disposal
did not discuss why the NLRB did not defer to the grievance process in this case, and criticized the
NLRB's failure to apply its deferral criteria evenhandedly or consistently. Id. at 844 n.4 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting),
160 Id.
"5, Id. at 827; id. at 844 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162 id. at 846 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 846-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing ARO, 596 F.2d at 717).
164 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 847 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 841.
' 66 Id. The Court did not decide the issue of whether the activity was protected. For a discussion
of the possible ramifications of this limitation of the Court's decision, see infra note 197.
' 67 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 830-39. In considering the policies of collective bargaining, indus-
trial peace, equalized bargaining power between employees and employer, and deferral to the
arbitration process, the Court focused on individual rights. Id.
LO" See supra notes 42-85 and accompanying text.
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City Disposal Court used the proper method of analysis, the Court ignored the principle
of exclusive representation when it interpreted that provision. As a result of the City
Disposal Court ignoring the principle of exclusive representation, unions' bargaining
power will decrease, grievance-arbitration procedures will lose effectiveness, and union-
ization will decline.
A. Section 7 Should Be Interpreted in Light of the Underlying Principles of the NLRA
Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in City Disposal, circuit courts were split into two camps, however, over how to
interpret the term "concerted activities."L 70 One view, taken by the City Disposal Court,
argued that "concerted" should be interpreted in light of the underlying principles of
the NLRA,' 71 and not merely by the strict language of section 7. 172 The opposing view,
taken by Justice O'Connor in the dissenting opinion to City Disposal,'" and by those
circuit courts that had rejected the Interboro doctrine,"4 advocated a more literal inter-
pretation of the language of section 7.
A broad interpretation of section 7, which considers the concepts which underlie
the Act, will produce decisions more consistent with the purposes of the NLRA. The
Act cannot be read in a vacuum. 175 As Justice Frankfurter once noted, statutes "are not
abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy arising out of specific situations
and addressed to the attainment of particular ends."" 6 Thus the meaning of "concerted
activities" may only be understood after examining the underlying principles of the
NLRA.
Moreover, the Supreme Court traditionally has interpreted the meaning of the
language of the Act in light of the Act's underlying purposes. The Supreme Court has
169 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
' 7" See supra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 830-39. The Court considered the policy of encouraging collective
bargaining as a means of resolving industrial disputes. Id, at 833-35. The Court also recognized
the principle of equal bargaining power between employer and employees when it interpreted
section 7 of the NLRA, and discussed the policy of deferring to the grievance procedure. Id. at
835-39. See supra notes 90-99,115-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which
lower courts previously had adopted this method of interpretation.
172 City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 831.
"3 Id. at 846-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174 Royal, 703 F.2d at 374 (Ninth Circuit limited its interpretation to the express language of
the Act); Roadway, 700 F.2d at 693-94 (Eleventh Circuit adhered to limited interpretation of
concerted activities announced in Mushroom, 330 F.2d at 685 (where Third Circuit interpreted
"concerted activities" to require that activity be "looking toward group action")); ARC), 596 F.2d at
717 ("We think' this expansive reading of the concerted activity clause of section 7 goes too far.");
Buddies Supermarkets, 481 F.2d at 719 (Fifth Circuit questioned statutory basis for Interboro doctrine);
Northern Metal, 440 F.2d at 884-85 (Third Circuit adhered to strict definition of "concert").
17, See Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286,329-31 (1981) (although they support the rationale behind
the Interboro doctrine, these commentators advocate a reading of section 7 which considers the
policies behind the language of the Act).
' 7" Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLuai. L. REV. 527,533 (1947).
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long accepted the grievance and arbitration process as the preferred method of labor
dispute resolution.'" A strictly literal interpretation of the Act, however, does not suggest
that the grievance and arbitration procedure is the quid pro quo for a no-strike provision
in the collective bargaining agreement, or is the favored method of labor dispute reso-
lution."8 In the Steelworkers Trilogy,'" however, the Supreme Court attempted to satisfy
an underlying goal of the Act, which is to encourage the collective bargaining process
in order to promote industrial peace. Thus the Court established the arbitration process
as the quid pro quo for a no-strike agreement and as the favored method of labor
dispute resolution.'" Therefore, while the Act does not expressly grant such favored
status to the grievance and arbitration process, this process has become as much a part
of the national labor policy as collective bargaining at the negotiating table. 18 '
The rigid interpretation of the language of the Act advocated by Justice O'Connor
in the dissenting opinion to City Disposal,' 82 and by courts such as the Sixth Circuit in
ARO,'" tnay have failed to discover the advantages of the grievance and arbitration
process in resolving labor disputes. Interpreting section 7 in a vacuum risks failing to
incorporate practices like the grievance and arbitration process that encourage collective
bargaining and industrial peace; or even worse, a strictly literal interpretation may result
in decisions that are contrary to underlying principles of the NLRA.' 84 Therefore, the
'" See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
174 Although section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)
provides in part that "Minal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpre-
tation of an existing collective bargaining agreement," nothing in the labor legislation suggests a
quid pro quo relationship between an arbitration clause and a no-strike provision, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1982).
179 United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) (Court viewed
arbitration clause as quid pro quo for no-strike clause). See also United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (followed American Mfg. holding that arbitration
was favored method of labor dispute resolution and quid pro quo for no-strike clause); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4 (1960).
'" Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
' 81 See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 373 (1974). The Gateway
Court, citing Warrior & Gulf, held that an order to arbitrate a particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Id. (citing Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 578).
182 Disposal, 465 U.S. at 847 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (the Court's decision "stretches the
language past its snapping point to cover an employee's action that is taken solely for personal
benefit").
'" 596 F.2d at 717 (court objected to expansive reading of concerted activities clause of section
7).
'" For example, in spite of the express exclusion of picketing from the shelter of the proviso
to section 8(b)(4) of the Act, the Court has concluded that some consumer picketing is in fact
exempted from the reach of that section. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S.
58, 63 (1964). The proviso to section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act provides that publicity to inform the
public that a product is produced by an employer with whom the union has a primary dispute is
not prohibited by that section, unless such publicity induces employees not of the primary employer
to refuse to perform their jobs at their workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1982). The proviso,
however, expressly excludes picketing from its protection. "[Niothing contained in the proviso]
shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). Rather than construing the language of section 8(b)(4)
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City Disposal Court's method of considering the underlying principles of the Act when
interpreting section 7 is the preferred approach. Despite using the proper approach,
however, the Court focused too narrowly on individual rights and ignored the more
basic principle of exclusive representation upon which the Act rests.
B. The City Disposal Court Ignored the Principle of Exclusive Representation
Exclusive representation is a fundamental principle upon which the NLRA is
based.'" Section 9(a) of the Act expressly establishes the concept of exclusive represen-
tation as a basic principle of national labor policy,' 86 and the Supreme Court has devel-
oped the concept in cases such as J.I. Case and Emporium Capwell,L 87 In these cases, the
Court recognized that the NLRA is based on the premise that employees can most
effectively obtain improvements in wages and other working conditions by pooling their
economic strength and bargaining through a system of exclusive representation.'" As
discussed above, the City Disposal Court utilized the preferred approach of interpreting
section 7 by considering the underlying principles of the NLRA.' 89 In examining the
underlying purposes of the Act, however, the Court focused on individual employee
rights and failed to consider a dominant principle of the Act, the concept of exclusive
rep reseal tation. 19°
The Court's emphasis on the rights of individual employees to have their collectively
bargained rights enforced is unjustified in City Disposal. Individual rights are adequately
protected by federal labor policy. The principle of exclusive representation that the City
Disposal Court ignored does not authorize tyranny by the majority, as some legislators
literally, the Court examined the legislative history of that section of the NLRA and determined
that a proviso which excepts "publicity other than picketing" did not reflect with enough clarity a
congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites. Vegetable Packers,
377 U.S. at 63. The Court's conclusion was based on a consideration of the purposes underlying
section 8(h)(4) and not just on the express language of that provision. Id.
But see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147 (1983); 1983-1984 Annual Survey of
Labor Law, The Limits of an Expansive Reading of the Section 8(b)(4) Publicity Proviso: Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 26 B.C.L. Rev. 230 (1984) (discussion of a more limited interpretation
of the section 8(b)(4) publicity proviso).
'" 79 CONG. REC. 2372 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). In introducing the bill that became
the NLRA, Senator Wagner emphasized the importance of the provisions establishing majority rule
as an underlying principle of the NLRA: "[W]ithout them [the provisions establishing exclusive
representation] the phrase 'collective bargaining' is devoid of meaning, and the very few unfair
employers are encouraged to divide their workers against themselves." Id. See Cox, supra note 43,
at 638, 652.
18' 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment ....
Id.
187
 Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 68;	 Case, 321 U.S. at 338-39. See supra notes 55-85 and
accompanying text fir a more detailed discussion of these cases.
'88 Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62; J.!. Case, 321 U.S. at 338.
'89 See supra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
190 See City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 830-39. Nowhere in the opinion of the Court does Justice
Brennan discuss the effect of City Disposal on the rights of the group.
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maintained.'" National labor policy attempts to balance individual rights with those
group rights advanced by the principle of exclusive representation. First, the Court has
imposed a duty of fair representation on the union representative.'" Second, the NLRA
provides for decertification elections of exclusive representatives when dissatisfied em-
ployees request such a procedure.'" Third, federal legislation has provided a bill of
rights for labor organization members to assure that minority voices are heard in unions
as they are heard in the functioning of other democratic institutions.' 94
Thus, the protection that the City Disposal Court afforded to individual employees
attempting to enforce collectively bargained rights is misplaced. If the union unfairly
represented the employee's interests in City Disposal by refusing to process his grievance,
the individual employee has causes of action against the union for violation of its duty
of fair representation' 95 and against the employer for interfering with his or her right
to engage in concerted activities.' 96 The facts of City Disposal do not provide any indication
that the union violated its duty of fair representation when it found the employee's
grievance unmeritorious and declined to process it. Indeed, the employee himself did
not even allege such a violation, Thus, in interpreting the "concerted activities" language
of section 7, the City Disposal Court should have focused on the concept of exclusive
representation, which is a basic principle underlying the Act.
C. Effects of the City Disposal Court Ignoring the Principle of Exclusive Representation
By ignoring the principle of exclusive representation and focusing On the rights of
individual employees, the City Disposal decision is likely to affect the function of unions
in labor-management relations. This section of the casenote will assert that the City
Disposal decision has a negative impact on labor-management relations in three ways.
First, by permitting employees to bring suit individually to seek enforcement of their
collectively bargained rights, the City Disposal decision may reduce unions' ability to keep
their members organized as a group. This reduction in the solidarity of unions could
significantly diminish some exclusive representatives' ability to exert economic pressure
on employers through threatened group action. Second, derogation of the grievance
and arbitration process may also result because some employees may be able to get more
favorable settlements on their own and some employers may be encouraged to engage
191 See 93 Coicc. REC. 3443-44 (1947) (statement of Rep. Gwinn). During the time labor unions
have been important institutions in labor-management relations, they have been criticized. Rep.
Gwinn expressed his dissatisfaction with labor unions during debates over the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, claiming that the American worker was no longer free. He argued that the
worker's whole economic life was dominated by the monopolistic union, that the union in every
way had ruled the worker's life. "In short, his mind, his soul, and his very life have been subject to
a tyranny more despotic than one could think possible in a free country." Id.
1 '12 Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 64; Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.
1 " 29 U.S.G. § 159(c) (1982). Employees have the periodic right to vote out a union in a
decertification election, though such right is limited by rules designed to provide stability for a
representative newly recognized or in the process of negotiating a new collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id.
194 Id. §§ 911-415, See supra note 54 for a discussion of the relevant provisions of the Landrum-
Griffen Act.
195 Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 64; Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.
196 Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA provides that it is a violation of the Act for an employer to
interfere with an employee's exercise of his or her rights to organize, bargain collectively, and
engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
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in tactics that further undercut the bargaining power of the union. Finally, the role of
unions in labor-management relations may decline, and thus a reduction in rights for
employees as a group may be anticipated)"
I. Reduction in Bargaining Power of the Exclusive Representative
A great deal of a bargaining representative's power is derived from the mere fact
that it is the exclusive representative of all employee interests)" Control over the
grievance procedure allows the union to consider the collective interests of the unit and
act on behalf of these collective interests)" In recognition of these benefits of exclusive
representation, the NLRA encourages employees to act together in order to equalize
"7 The City Disposal decision may also shift the focus of inquiry when interpretation of section
7 is involved from whether activity is "concerted" to whether it is "protected." The Court did not
decide whether the activity at issue in City Disposal was protected by the Act; it decided only that it
was concerted. City Disposal, 465 U.S at 841. Applying the standards stated by the Court in City
Disposal, the employee loses the protection of the Act if the concerted activity he or she engaged in
was undertaken in an "abusive manner, or if the concerted activity violated a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement which limits the manner in which employees may invoke their
collective bargained rights." Id. at 837. The battle over how to interpret section 7 of the NLRA may
merely shift in focus from "concerted" to "protected" activities. Instead of debating over the meaning
of "concerted," courts might very well shift the debate to a determination of what activity is abusive
enough to render itself unprotected by the Act. In Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 177, 103
L.R.R.M. 1154 (1980), under facts similar to City Disposal, similar employee activity was found to
be unprotected. Id. at 181, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1156-57. The employee's concerted activity in City
Disposal, however, was found to be protected under both standards on remand by the Sixth Circuit.
766 F.2d 969, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1985) (on remand from 465 U.S. 822 (1984)).
First, in City Disposal the Sixth Circuit did not find that this employee's activity was "abusive."
766 F.2d at 974. The Supreme Court's stated standard of "abusive conduct" rests upon the principles
that passions run high in any labor dispute, and thus an employee's right to engage in concerted
activity may permit some leeway for impulsive behavior. City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 837 (citing Crown
Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970)). This right to engage in
impulsive concerted activities must be balanced against the employer's right to maintain order and
respect. Crown Central, 430 F.2d at 730. In City Disposal, the Sixth Circuit would have been out of
line with those cases interpreting this standard if it had found on remand that this employee's
refusal to drive a truck that he felt was unsafe to be abusive, and thus unprotected, activity. See
Crown Central, 430 F.2d at 731 (abusive and profane language still held to be protected); Hugh H.
Wilson Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1356 (3d Cir. 1969). Second, the Sixth Circuit held that the
employee's activity in City Disposal did not violate a provision of the collective bargaining agreement
and was not "unjustified" under Article XI of that agreement. City Disposal, 766 F.2d at 974.
While the Supreme Court's City Disposal decision appears to point to a finding that the activity
at issue was protected, by leaving that issue undecided, the Supreme Court in City Disposal made it
possible that the standards for "protected" activity may change to account for the new standard of
"concerted activities" that the Court established. The law of ''concerted activities" may merely reflect
the changing values that have prompted Congress, the Board, and the courts to attempt to solve a
problem to which no solution exists. The concept of "concerted activities" necessarily involves
conflicting poles, the employer's prerogative to hire and fire for legitimate business reasons versus
employees' right to exert economic pressure on their employer. See Note, Concerted Activity Under
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 129, 144.
1 " Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62; f.l. Case, 321 U.S. at 338-39. See supra notes 56-85 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Emporium Capwell and f J. Case.
1 " A union's power of control over the grievance procedure is always checked by its duty of
fair representation, the threat of a decertification election, and the possibility of an unfair labor
practice suit. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
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bargaining power between employees and their employer. 20° The City Disposal decision,
however, permits individuals to circumvent the exclusive representative by simply basing
their claims in a right contained within the collective bargaining agreement. 2°' When
individuals can circumvent the elected bargaining representative, opportunity for indi-
vidual advantage within the unit exists. When individuals can resolve grievances con-
cerning the collective bargaining agreement on their own, without any consideration for
group interests, opportunity for individual advantage creates rivalry, mistrust, and unrest
among employees. 202
Further, a weakness in group unity will be difficult to hide from the employer
because employees can deal directly with the employer to settle lawsuits. Knowing that
the exclusive representative is bargaining on behalf of a unit with divided interests, the
employer may engage in much tougher negotiating tactics at subsequent contract ne-
gotiations because the threat of a strike may be diminished when employees have many-
divergent interests and the opportunity for individual gain exists.
The power of the elected union to protect against erosion of its status as exclusive
representative by disciplining members who violate union rules during a strike has been
held to be an integral part of national labor policy. 203 The power to control union
membership by disciplining strike-breakers is essential if the union is to be an effective
bargaining agent for its members. 204 As long as a union functions with the purpose of
fighting the employer for economic gains, any acts which interfere with the union's
effectiveness are a threat to the union's existence. 205 Dissension within its membership
200 Section 1 of the NLRA recognizes the inequality in bargaining power between corporate
employers and employees who are unorganized. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section 1 therefore
states as a policy of the NLRA that the practice and procedure of collective bargaining will be
encouraged, and that workers will have freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purposes of negotiating a collective agreement.
Id. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
2U1 The fact that unions pay the cost of the grievance process while the individual employee
must bear the cost of his own lawsuit, however, may deter many employees from pursuing their
own actions.
2"2 93 CONG. REC. 3624 (1947) (statement of Rep. Lanham). Representative Lanham argued
against granting individual employees the right to present and settle grievances -over wages, hours
and conditions of employment without participation of the exclusive representative who represented
the interests of the majority. Allowing employers to thus play off one group of employees against
the other, according to Representative Lanham, would result in "rivalry, dissension, suspicion, and
friction among employees," and thus undermine the collective bargaining representative. Id.
2°3 Allis -Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181 (the Court held that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions against
restraint or coercion of an employee to refrain from concerted activities contained in section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act did not include a ban against fines on members who refused to honor an
authorized strike),
While a union may discipline its members, the Board has recently held that unions could not
enforce any rules which limited members' right to resign, even during a strike. International Ass'n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 1414 and Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc., 270 N,L.R.B,
1330, 1332-33, 116 L.R.R.M. 1257, 1258-59 (1984). The Board's Neufeld decision overruled prior
cases which had permitted "reasonable" union rules restricting resignations. Previous Board prec-
edent had found rules restricting resignation for thirty days to be prima facie reasonable. See
Machinists, Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984, 111  L.R.R.M. 1115 (1982),
204 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 04 HARV.
L. REV. 1049, 1049, 1100 (1951) ("[d]iscipline of individual [union] members is essential if a union
is to survive," yet some consistent body of law is needed to "protect union members from injustice").
205 See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 lixims. & LAB. REL. REV. 483, 488-91 (1950)
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weakens the union's bargaining position with the employer. 206 Thus, the employer can
afford to withhold benefits it otherwise might have granted to employees because the
exclusive representative may be unsuccessful in organizing an effective strike where
employees are not united. The bargaining power of the exclusive representative may
thus eventually be reduced by the City Disposal decision, which permits employees to
individually enforce collectively bargained rights.
2. Derogation of the Grievance and Arbitration Process
In addition to permitting individual employees to seek enforcement of their collec-
tive bargaining agreement on their own, the City Disposal decision may also diminish the
effectiveness of the grievance and arbitration process. Exclusive representation by a
union is attractive to employees not only because of the bargaining power such a rep-
resentative has at contract negotiations, but also because of the exclusive representative's
ability to enforce the collective bargaining agreement through the grievance and arbi-
tration process. The Supreme Court has recognized the grievance and arbitration process
as "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself."207 The Court has held
that the grievance and arbitration process is the method of labor dispute resolution that
best serves the purpose of the NLRA: to encourage collective bargaining in order to
reduce industrial strife.208 Federal labor policy strongly favors arbitration of labor dis-
putes because the relatively peaceful arbitration process replaces the industrial upheaval
of a strike. 209
The City Disposal decision, however, permits an individual employee to circumvent
the grievance and arbitration process favored by federal labor policy by basing his or
her claim upon a right contained in the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
Where individuals can circumvent the grievance and arbitration process to get collectively
bargained rights enforced for their personal benefit, employees may no longer perceive
the exclusive representative as necessary to enforce those rights effectively. Recent re-
ports indicate that employees may be abandoning the union in some circumstances
[hereinafter cited as Summers, Disciplinary Powers]. The union's primary function is to obtain
economic benefits for its members. Its strength, in fact, its very existence depends on its being an
effective instrument for the workers ... ." Id.
206 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960) (holding that use of
economic weapons to pressure the employer to concede more favorable provisions to employees is
authorized by the NLRA and national labor policy). Collective bargaining presupposes the avail-
ability to parties of certain economic weapons. A strike is probably the most effective economic
weapon the employees possess, and the Court in Insurance Agents recognized the legitimacy of using
an economic weapon such as a strike because it is both sides' risk of loss from a strike that makes
collective bargaining work. Id. See also C. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 517 ("the use of economic
pressure is part and parcel of collective bargaining").
20 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)
("arbitrators ... are indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process").
208 Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596 (Court noted the arbitrator's unique ability to settle disputes
at the plant level); Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581 (arbitration gives meaning and content to the
collective bargaining agreement); American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567 ("[a]rbitration is a stabilizing
influence").
2°9 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
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because the exclusive representative is less effective in obtaining or enforcing these rights
than an individual employee attempting to obtain or enforce rights on his own. 2 1°
Perhaps as important, however, such individual action by employees may afford
employers an opportunity to rid themselves of the union by further undercutting the
power of the exclusive representative. By granting favorable settlements to individual
employees who seek enforcement of their collectively bargained rights on their own, and
by hotly contesting grievances when resolution is sought through the grievance and
arbitration process, an employer may create strong incentives for employees to ignore
the exclusive representative and the grievance procedure as means of enforcing the
collective bargaining agreement."'
The union in City Disposal found that the individual employee's grievance lacked
merit and refused to process it. 212 The Court, however, permitted the employee to seek
enforcement of his collective bargaining agreement outside the grievance and arbitration
process. 213 Employees acting individually and employees who have acted in conjunction
with at least one other employee, according to the Court, are equally well-positioned to
go through the grievance and arbitration process. 214 The Court reasoned that an indi-
vidual's assertions of a collectively bargained right do not undermine the grievance and
arbitration process any more than does the approach of those courts that had rejected
the Interboro doctrine and required individual's actions to be intended to benefit other
employees. 213 The Court's reasoning misses the point. The erosion of the grievance and
arbitration process that the City Disposal decision may cause is contrary to national labor
policy, regardless of whether that derogation is more or less inimical to labor policy than
21 " Boston Globe, Feb. 24,1985, at 61, col. 1. Today, organized labor represents less than twenty
Percent of the American workforce, the lowest level in decades. Id. Workers' decisions to form or
join unions is primarily based upon the expected economic benefits from union membership. B.
FLEISHER & T. KNIESNER, LABOR ECONOMICS 223-25 (2d ed. 1980); Summers, Disciplinary Powers,
ROM note 205, at 488-91 ("The union's primary function is to obtain economic benefits for its
members.").
While other factors such as product market and labor market shifts account for some of the
decline in unionization, see Roomkin & Juris, Unions in the Traditional Sectors: The Mid-Life Passage
of the Labor Movement, in 4 READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 98,98-100 (R.
Rowan ed. 1980), the effect of public policy and judicial decisions on the effectiveness of unions in
obtaining increases in wages and other benefits is also determinative of the rate of unionization. B.
FLEISHER & T. KNIESNER, supra, at 228-32. Historically, the legal environment has affected the rate
of organization by reinforcing the economic circumstances influencing employees' decisions to
organize. Id. at 228. But see id. at 332 (state right to work laws may have little effect on the downtrend
in union membership); Roomkin & juris, supra, at 10i-02 ("It is not clear that public policy factors
make a separate contribution to union growth or decline.").
21 ' 93 GONG. REC. 3624 (1947) (statement of Rep. Lanham). Representative Lanham argued
that there would be grave consequences in the labor relations area if individual and group bar-
gaining were required, despite the certification of a collective bargaining representative. Mr. Lanham
pointed out that soon after the Wagner Act (the NLRA) had been declared constitutional, many
unions nevertheless succumbed quickly because favorable settlements of grievances occurred only
when the workers sought adjustment individually. Id. Representative Lanham noted that workers
soon found that the union in their unit had evaporated,•and the employer had then returned to
its prior practice of denying most reasonable requests. Employees were then forced to start all over
again and establish a new union. Id.
212 city Disposal, 465 U.S. at 827.
215 Id. at 841.
214 Id. at 838.
215 Id.
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other standards of "concert" proposed by some circuit courts. 21 ° Allowing two employees
to process grievances outside the grievance and arbitration processes without any union
participation also erodes the grievance and arbitration process. The bargaining repre-
sentative ought to have some ability under a collective bargaining agreement to control
prosecutions of claims of breach of contract, whether by pressing grievances, invoking
arbitration, or initiating legal proceedings. 2 " Individuals are best protected through the
bargaining representative's duty of fair representation, 218 not by pressing their grievances
separately.
Thus, by permitting individual employees to avoid the grievance and arbitration
process by basing their claims on their collective bargaining agreement, the City Disposal
decision may seriously diminish the effectiveness and use of that process. Employers,
employees, and the exclusive representative may no longer perceive the grievance pro-
cedure as important or effective 2 '° when the union cannot screen frivolous claims out
of the process, 22° or when those same claims may be pursued outside that process.'221
216 1d.
217 See Cox, supra note 43, at 625-27, 638. Cox listed six policy reasons why the bargaining
representative should have control over the processing of contract breach claims. First, in some
instances no one individual is harmed to pursue the claim. Id. at 625. Second, resolutions of disputes
affect not only the current parties, but the future implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 625-26. Third. many claims of contract violations affect other employees besides
the claimant. Id. at 626. Fourth, union control over claims promotes uniformity, and thus reduces
competition and discrimination within the unit. Id. Fifth, without control, a union may get caught
between rival groups of employees, keeping the union from taking a "reasonable position," and
thus delaying resolution. Id. at 625. Finally, many claims are actually disputes between employees,
and these are better handled by the union than by arbitration. Id. at 626-27.
218 Id. at 638. Cox' advanced the idea that collective bargaining would work better, without
sacrifice of individual interests, if "contracts which provide for their administration through the
grievance and arbitration procedure controlled by the union are construed to place the sole authority
to settle grievances in the union," subject to its fiduciary duty of fair representation. Id.
719 See Note, Protection of Individual Action as "Concerted Activity" Under the Notional Labor Relations
Act, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 391 (1983) (student authors contend that when individuals can
circumvent the grievance procedure too frequently, the employer and employees no longer accept
that procedure as the most efficacious means of resolving a labor dispute) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Protection of Individual Action]: Note, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The
Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 152, 173-74 (1972) (the note recognizes that
adoption of the Interboro doctrine may result in circumvention of grievance procedures by large
numbers of employees, but argues that a distinction between one employee and two employees in
determining who may pursue claims of contract breach is not meaningful).
420 See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1962).
The Second Circuit concluded that chaos would result if every disenchanted employee who harbored
a dislike for his employer could harass both the union and employer by processing grievances
through the various steps of the grievance procedure and ultimately by bringing an action to compel
arbitration in the face of clear contractual provisions intended to channel the enforcement remedy
through the union. Id. at 186. See also Note, Protection of Individual Action, supra note 219, at 391
(student authors point out that the Interboro doctrine, which was adopted by the City Disposal Court,
provides an effective means for disgruntled individuals to harass employers); Note, The Sixth Circuit
Spurns Interboro and the Doctrine of Constructive Concerted Activity — ARO, Inc. v. NLRB Leaves Non-
Union Employees at the Mercy of Their Bosses, 1 I U. Tot. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (1980) (recognizing the
same).
221
 Griffin v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agriculture Implement Work-
ers of Am., 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) (the court permitted a union to screen grievances
and then process those the union concludes will justify the expense and time involved in terms of
benefiting the membership at large).
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3. Decline in Unionization
If the exclusive representative loses effectiveness in negotiating labor agreements
and in enforcing those agreements, employees in that particular unit may no longer
perceive the union as useful. The union may continue to collect dues, but it may obtain
only insignificant gains for employees because it lacks bargaining power and is routinely
circumvented in processing grievances by individual employees. Even if employees
choose not to decertify the exclusive representative, 222 they may gradually lose interest
in a union that is essentially nonfunctional, and in some cases employees and union
officials alike may abandon it.
Recent statistics show that employees are abandoning unions. 223 While some of that
decline in union membership may be attributed to shifts in the composition of the
workforce, a significant cause of the decline may be the diminished effectiveness of
unions.22  A union's bargaining power for the unit is diminished after decisions like City
Disposal, which in effect promote the rights of individuals at the cost of reducing the
power of the organized unit. Employees may decide to resign from union membership
when their union has not beers instrumental in obtaining or enforcing gains in benefits
for employees. There is a real danger, however, that as unions disappear from some
units, the rights already obtained for employees in those units will disappear also.
Without the presence of a union, the employer can unilaterally adopt new work rules,
unilaterally adjust wages, exercise favoritism in settling grievances, grant pay increases
to certain individuals, and promote and lay off selected employees. 225 These same prac-
tices probably caused the employees to organize in the first place, and will likely be the
moving force behind the reorganization of the unit sometime in the future. 226 In the
meantime, however, employees will unnecessarily lose rights.
222 Section 9(c) of the NLRA provides for decertification elections, so long as the exclusive
representative is not insulated within one of the decertification election-bars. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(1982). See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
Roomkin & juris, supra note 210 (the data on union membership unambiguously document
a decline in the percentage of the workforce affiliated with unions); Boston Globe, Feb. 24, 1985
at 61, col. 1 (organized labor represents less than twenty percent of American workforce today, the
lowest figure in decades).
224 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
22s 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Section 8 of the NLRA has been interpreted to require employers
to bargain with the elected representative over mandatory subjects of bargaining. The employer
may not make unilateral changes in mandatory subject areas such as wages, layoffs, contracting for
work, and other subjects that directly affect the employee, unless it has bargained to an "impasse"
with the bargaining representative. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TF.xr ON LABOR LAW 496-98 (1976). If
the employees choose not to bargain collectively, however, the employer is free to make changes in
those mandatory subject areas as it sees fit. Cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203, 210 (1964) (the Court discussed the parties' freedom to refuse to bargain in the context of
nonmandatory subjects as defined in section 8(d)). A more detailed analysis of section 8 and its
interpretation is beyond the scope of this article.
225 See B. FLEISHER & T. KNIESNER, supra note 210, at 223-24; A. GOLDMAN, LABOR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATiONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 122 (1979); Ryscavage, Measuring Union-
Nonunion Earnings Differences, 97 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (Dec. 1974). Employees' decisions to form
or join labor unions are a function of the economic benefits which union membership can provide.
B. FLEISHER & T. KNIESNER, supra note 210, at 223-24. In 1974, the union-represented worker was
better paid than his nonorganized counterpart. Ryscavage, supra, at 3. Furthermore, nonwage
benefits, such as job security clauses, grievance procedures, rest periods, and clean-up periods,
which are typically enjoyed by union workers, are usually unavailable to nonunion members. A.
GOLDMAN, supra, at 122.
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In interpreting the "concerted activities" clause of section 7 of the NLRA, the City
Disposal Court examined the underlying purposes of the Act. Although the Court cor-
rectly recognized that statutory language cannot be read in a vacuum, the Court focused
on individual employee rights and not on the principle of exclusive representation.
Exclusive representation, however, is the basic principle underlying the NLRA; it is that
principle which encourages employees to unite as a group for their mutual benefit in
order to achieve equal bargaining power with their employer. The City Disposal decision,
therefore, may reduce the bargaining power of the exclusive representative, derogate
the grievance and arbitration process, and cause a decline in unionization. Thus, the
relative economic strength of employees will be weakened. The irony is that, after City
Disposal, employees may find themselves with fewer collective rights to enforce.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal resolved the split among the circuit
courts over what constitutes concerted activities under section 7 of the NLRA. Some
courts of appeals, like the Second Circuit in lnterboro, advocated taking a broad approach
to this issue and considered the underlying policies of the NLRA. Other circuits followed
the decision of the Sixth Circuit in ARO and took a more literal approach in determining
which activities by individual employees would constitute concerted activities under
section 7.
In City Disposal, the Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of the "concerted
activities" language of section 7 of the NLRA. The Court held that an individual em-
ployee's assertion of a collectively bargained right was a concerted activity under the Act.
The Court reasoned that its decision was consistent with the intent of the NLRA to
encourage collective bargaining by equalizing bargaining power between employees and
employer throughout the term of the employment relationship. The Court, therefore,
asserted that the City Disposal decision was consistent with the national labor policy goal
of promoting industrial stability. The dissenters, however, argued that holding the in-
dividual's activity to be concerted was too expansive an interpretation of the language
of section 7 of the NLRA, and shifted labor contract dispute resolution from arbitrators
and the courts to the NLRB without congressional action.
Although the City Disposal Court examined the underlying purposes of the NLRA
in interpreting the meaning of "concerted activities," the Court mistakenly focused on
the concept of individual employee rights and ignored the more basic principle of
exclusive representation that underlies the NLRA. This principle of exclusive represen-
tation gives meaning to the term collective bargaining because employees have bargaining
power only as an united group. Permitting individual employees to circumvent the
grievance and arbitration process and the exclusive representative merely by couching
their complaints in a provision of the collective bargaining agreement may eventually
reduce the bargaining power of the exclusive representative. If this reduction occurs,
employees as a group will obtain fewer rights from their employers in future collective
bargaining agreements. Ironically, individual employees, whom the City Disposal Court
sought to protect by permitting them to independently seek enforcement of collectively
bargained rights, may now have fewer of those collective rights to enforce.
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